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NOTE: This article highlights some of the
research findings that appear in the
authors’ new book, International Trade
and Labor Markets, which was published
by the Upjohn Institute.

W

hile academicians generally
argue that reducing trade barriers
enhances aggregate welfare, legislation
aimed at liberalizing trade often meets
fierce opposition in public and political
arenas. Counted among the opposition are
groups concerned about the losses
suffered by workers whose jobs disappear
under the weight of import competition.
Even academic economists, who tend to
rail against protectionist sentiment,
readily admit that freer trade does harm
some groups, perhaps even displaces
workers.
Indeed, a burgeoning literature
attempting to measure the losses to
dislocated workers has produced some
disquieting findings. For example,
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993)
estimate that the average dislocated
worker suffers a loss in expected lifetime
income of $80,000. Kletzer (2001) finds
similar but less-dramatic results. In her
study, the average dislocated worker takes
a 12 percent pay cut, while the median
worker sees her wage fall by 5 percent.
Troubled by such large personal losses,
some academic economists have joined
the growing movement in the policy
community in calling for direct
compensation of workers dislocated by
trade liberalization.1
For more than half a century the
benefits of freer trade have been
understood in the context of the

Samuelson compensation principle: the
winners gain enough from liberalization
to allow them to fully compensate the
losers without exhausting all of their
gains.2 Thus, one way of viewing those
who have been pushing for “wage
insurance” for dislocated workers is that
they are just taking this argument to its
logical conclusion—if we can afford to
compensate these workers, we should.3
After all, if we choose to liberalize trade,
we must realize that we are choosing to
harm some groups. One might argue that
equity requires coupling policies aimed at
liberalizing trade with policies aimed at
compensating displaced workers.
Not everyone would find an equitybased argument for compensation

“One might argue that equity
requires coupling policies aimed
at liberalizing trade with policies
aimed at compensating displaced
workers . . . even in the absence
of equity considerations,
practical political considerations
suggest coupling liberalization
with compensation.”

compelling. Some might point out that the
dislocated workers were receiving
economic rents when trade barriers
protected their jobs, calling into question
policies that would provide these workers
with even more compensation by
subsidizing them when they switch
sectors. Even in the absence of equity
considerations, practical political

considerations suggest coupling
liberalization with compensation. Since
those opposed to freer trade often fight
against liberalization, an offer to
compensate displaced workers for their
losses might convince some groups to
change their position and offer support
instead, making freer trade easier to
achieve.
The academic literature is surprisingly
silent regarding the design of optimal
policies aimed at compensating displaced
workers. Indeed, there is only a modest
amount of literature devoted to any issue
related to compensating those harmed by

“The academic literature is
surprisingly silent regarding
the design of optimal policies
aimed at compensating
displaced workers.”
liberalization.4 One reason is that the vast
majority of all of the academic research
connecting worker welfare and
globalization begins from a premise of
frictionless factor markets, where all
adjustments that might be motivated by
liberalization occur instantly. These
models focus on the long run and leave no
room to address many of the concerns
outlined above.
In our monograph, International Trade
and Labor Markets: Theory, Evidence,
and Policy Implications (Davidson and
Matusz 2004), we first show that
traditional trade analysis can rather easily
be extended to allow for equilibrium
unemployment, job displacement, and
gradual adjustment, and that doing so
provides many new insights. We then use
our extended model to tackle difficult
issues such as the one raised above: if
society desires to compensate those who
are harmed by liberalization, what is the
best way to go about it?
The general-equilibrium model that we
use to address the issue of optimal
compensation has several important
components that are missing from
standard trade models. In our model,
workers must first train to acquire skills
and then search for employment in either
3
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a “high-tech sector,” where significant
skills and training are required and wages
are high, or a “low-tech sector,” in which
training is quick and cheap, far fewer
skills are required, and pay is low. We
assume that workers vary in ability, and
we show that equilibrium results in all
workers with ability above a critical level
being drawn to the high-tech sector with
all other workers in low-tech jobs.
To study the issue of adjustment and
compensation, we assume that the lowtech sector is initially protected by a small
tariff and then show that liberalization
harms two groups: those low-tech

“. . . if society desires to
compensate those who are
harmed by liberalization, what is
the best way to go about it?”
workers who choose to shift to the hightech sector (the movers), and those
workers who remain trapped in the
(previously protected) low-tech sector
because they do not have enough skills to
make the acquisition of high-tech jobs
attractive (the stayers). The movers, who
are the displaced workers in our setting,
lose for two reasons. First, although some
wind up with better-paying jobs after
relocating, others take a pay cut when
they find reemployment in the high-tech
sector. Second, these workers bear all of
the adjustment costs imposed on the
economy by liberalization—they must
first retrain and then search for new jobs,
both of which are costly processes.
We then turn to the issue of
compensation by searching for the policy
that fully compensates each group for
their losses while imposing the smallest
deadweight loss on the economy.5 One of
the advantages of our model is that it is
rich enough to allow us to compare all of
the compensation programs that have
been at the center of the policy debate:
wage subsidies, employment subsidies,
training subsidies, and unemployment
insurance (which is basically what trade
adjustment assistance has been in the
United States).

4
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We find that there are two rules that an
optimal compensation program should
satisfy. First, a program should have a
large impact on the welfare of the average
worker in the targeted group. If that is the
case, then full compensation can be
achieved with only a modest-sized
program. Second, if we define the
marginal worker to be the worker who is
just indifferent between high- and lowtech jobs under free trade, then an optimal
program should have only a small impact
on this worker’s welfare. The reason for
this is that any compensation scheme
distorts incentives and results in some
workers making inefficient labor market
decisions. If the marginal worker’s
welfare is largely insensitive to the policy
measure, then full compensation can be
achieved while generating only a small
amount of labor misallocation.
Applying these two rules, we find that
it is optimal to use a wage subsidy to
compensate movers, whereas an
employment subsidy (a subsidy to
employed workers which is independent
of the wage) works best to compensate
the stayers. The main reason for the
difference in the policy prescription has to
do with the composition of the workforce
in the two sectors: the high-tech sector is
populated with high-ability workers,

“One of the advantages of our
model is that it is rich enough
to allow us to compare all of the
compensation programs that
have been at the center of
the policy debate: wage
subsidies, employment subsidies,
training subsidies, and
unemployment insurance . . .”
whereas the low-tech sector attracts
largely low-ability workers. As a result,
the average high-tech worker has higher
ability than the marginal worker, whereas
the average low-tech worker has an
ability level below that of the marginal
worker. With a wage subsidy, the size of
the transfer received by a worker is

increasing in the wage, which is
increasing in ability. Thus, workers with
high ability value wage subsidies more
highly than their lower-ability
counterpart. This makes the wage subsidy
an attractive tool to use when
compensating the movers—the average
mover will value the program much more
than the marginal worker—thus, a

“By formally modeling the
training and search processes
that are at the core of the
adjustment process, our
monograph is one of the first
rigorous treatments of the type
of policy concerns that arise
when we take into account
adjustment costs.”
modest-sized program can be used,
generating only a small amount of
inefficient labor reallocation. In contrast,
the wage subsidy will lead to too much
labor reallocation if used to compensate
the stayers. This is due to the fact that the
marginal worker will value the wage
subsidy considerably more than the
average stayer (since the average stayer
has lower ability than the marginal
worker).
As there are no distortions in our
model (other than the initial tariff), we
know that the gains from trade are large
enough to fully compensate those harmed
by liberalization, but theory alone does
not tell us if the costs of the compensation
are large or small relative to the gains
from trade. To get a handle on the relative
magnitude of the costs of compensation,
we close our monograph by calibrating
the model using parameter estimates
based on U.S. labor market data. We find
that the overall cost to society is likely to
be modest, (in terms of deadweight loss)
provided the right policy is used.
However, attempting to compensate the
losers might completely wipe out the
gains from freer trade if the wrong policy
is used.
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The continuing rapid pace of global
integration brings with it a continuing
flow of displaced workers. It is
incumbent upon policy analysts to
carefully consider the distribution and
magnitude of adjustment costs that stem
from global shocks, and to think deeply
about the optimal design of policies
targeted at reducing those costs. By
formally modeling the training and search
processes that are at the core of the
adjustment process, our monograph is
one of the first rigorous treatments of the
type of policy concerns that arise when
we take into account adjustment costs.
Our hope is that our work demonstrates
that such issues can be tackled in tractable
settings, and that this will trigger other
academics to start taking these issues
more seriously.
Notes
1. See, for example, Jacobson, LaLonde, and
Sullivan (1993); Parsons (2000); and Kletzer
(2001).
2. This argument ignores the fact that such compensation is rarely offered.
3. See, for example, Baily, Burtless, and Litan
(1993); Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993);
Burtless et al. (1998); Parsons (2000); Kletzer
(2001); Kletzer and Litan (2001); and Hufbauer and
Goodrich (2001).
4. There are a small number of papers that are
relevant. First, there are those that ask whether the
losers could be compensated by the winners without
eating away all the gains from freer trade. Using a
traditional full employment model of trade, Dixit
and Norman (1980, 1986) have shown that there
does indeed exist a commodity tax scheme that can
achieve this objective—thus, liberalization can lead
to a true Pareto gain. However, Brecher and
Choudhri (1994) and Feenstra and Lewis (1994)
have raised concerns about whether this scheme will
work when unemployment is present or factors of
production are not perfectly mobile.
Second, a paper by Brander and Spencer (1994)
focuses on the optimal design of a wage subsidy
program aimed at compensating dislocated workers
for their losses. In a simple partial equilibrium
model in which the distribution of wages is held
fixed, they compare wage subsidies programs in
which the subsidy is tied to the gap between the preliberalization wage and the postliberalization wage
earned by displaced workers. Their goal is to determine whether the subsidy should be an increasing or
decreasing function of this gap. Their analysis finds
support for the Lawrence and Litan (1986) position
that the wage subsidy should be “tapered”—that is,
they show that the optimal subsidy is decreasing in
the wage gap.
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5. As noted above, society may wish to offer
such compensation due to equity concerns or simply
to make it easier to enact liberalizing legislation.

Both Carl Davidson and Steven Matusz are
professors of economics at Michigan State
University, and external research fellows
with the Leverhulme Centre for Research
on Globalization and Economic Policy at
the University of Nottingham.
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